Variable 9.01: Nationalization of Structure

1950-1972: 3
1973-1976: 4
1977-1990: 5

This code was chosen to recognize the fact that the CSU (Christlichsoziale Union) was largely an autonomous force based in Bavaria, and it cooperated with the CDU at the national level, primarily with the parliament. Within the CDU itself, the land associations were distinct components of the party with large areas of responsibility themselves.

Josef Herrmann Dufhues, leader of the Westphalian CDU, noted a lack of nationalization in his report to the party. "He had emphasized that not sufficient use was made of the headquarters [the BGS in Bonn], although it performed a reasonable task in distributing information and publicity material. While 'the confidence of the Landesverbaende [regional organizations] in the work of the BGS' had grown in recent years, he nevertheless warned that it would run aground if it 'ever tried to be he highest authority of command of the party.'" (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, pp. 253-4) The regional branches looked at the BGS in Bonn as a useful resource, but one without the authority to command the whole party. No coding change.

"With the loss of the Chancellorship, the Fraktion (CDU members in the Bundestag) finally broke with the pattern whereby it had played an auxiliary role in relation to successive Federal Governments, and it became "the indispensable core of the party."" (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 194). The parliamentary arm of the CDU outranked the other bodies after the CDU became the Opposition. No coding change; Laender still had more power than the national bodies regardless.

"Kurt Beidenkopf [CDU General Secretary] saw the BGS [Bundesgeschaeftstelle, the National Headquarters] more than simply the administrative center of the party. In his speech to the Hamburg Congress in November 1973, he noted: "The Konrad Adenauer House [site of the BGS] in Bonn is the place from which the party will be led."" (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 264)

In addition, "In 1973 the new party chairman Helmut Kohl and its then
general secretary Kurt Beidenkopf started to centralize the party organization. The Land parties were made responsible to the party headquarters in Bonn, which developed as... a service center for party activities at lower levels." (Jacobs, Francis, West European Political Parties, 1989, p. 455)

Kohl and Beidenkopf stripped the Laender organizations of their influence and concentrated all authority at the national level. Coding increased by 1 to reflect the loss of Laender power at the hands of the party chair.

"During the second Opposition period, the situation was a more open one, with the tendency towards a pluralistic and the greater weight acquired by the (extra-parliamentary) CDU." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 217) The Fraktion continued to struggle for dominance with the Party Headquarters in Bonn's Konrad Adenauer House. No coding change.

"Kohl's election as leader of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Fraktion in addition to his retention of the CDU chairmanship... brought about a new change in the personal structure of the CDU leadership." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 230) Kohl's dual positions of party chair and Fraktion leader erased all intra-party squabbles over power. +1 to signify that parliamentary activists are subordinate to the extra-parliamentary national party chair; in this case, the offices were held by the same person.

"There were many polemics that were against the centralizing tendencies of the socio-liberal coalition in Bonn among the CDU Laender until 1982."(Beyme, Klaus von, 1984. "West Germany; Federalism." International Political Science Review. pp. 381-395.) No coding change, because Kohl remained Chancellor and party chair.

On January 25, the East CDU of the GDR withdrew from the government coalition. When, on January 28, GDR interim leaders announced that free parliamentary elections would take place on March 18, the Christian Democrats lost no time. Four days later, the Chancellor met with leaders of the East CDU, the Democratic Awakening, and the new German Social Union, based on the CSU but more conservative. Kohl decided to back all three parties in an electoral pact called "Alliance for Germany." He forcefully called for support of Christian Democracy and German unity. (Wallach and Francisco, United Germany: The Past, Politics, Prospects, 1992, pp. 49-53, 84-86) The West CDU absorbed three conservative parties into its structure. No coding change.
Variable 9.02: Selecting the National Leader

1950-1990: 3

The federal party chairman was selected by the federal party convention. The federal party convention was composed of delegates from the land associations and of special representatives.

The executive manager of the party's central office (Bundesgeschaeftsfuehrer) was elected by the executive of the parliamentary Fraktion. Previously the manager had been chosen by National Executive (Bundesvortstand). (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 352) The party chair continued to be elected by the National Party Congress (Bundesparteitag), thus no coding change. The change in the National Executive was only a slight increase in parliamentary influence.

"The General Secretary (GeneralsekretŠr) of the party was elected on proposal of the chairman." In keeping with the Party Law of 1967, the CDU defined its leaders in legal terms. "The legal representatives of the party are the chairmen and the general secretary." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 352) The party chair was still elected by the National Party Congress. No change.

The National Party Congress elected seven rather than five deputy chairmen to the Praesidium as well as electing the national party chair. (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 353) No coding change; while the subordinates to the party chair increase, the chair him/herself remains elected in the same manner.

"The President of the European Parliament and the chairmen of the European parliamentary party are members of the Praesidium if they are members of the party." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 353). No coding change.

Variable 9.03: Selecting Parliamentary Candidates

1950-1966: 4
1967-1990: 6

The federal executive committee elected an election committee which, in cooperation with the land associations, participated in the nomination of list candidates for the Bundestag. However, candidate selection for district seats was by law given to the constituency party. Because the CDU obtained a majority of its seats from constituency elections, this provision produced more decentralization in CDU candidate selection than the other parties experience.
"Wahlkommision (Election Commission) abolished. The Bundesvorstand (National Executive) has the right to veto the selection of a constituency candidate by a member's or delegates' assembly. In this case, according to the electoral law, the procedure has to be repeated. The decision will be binding thereafter." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 369) The National Executive gained the power to approve all regional choices. Therefore, a coding change of +2 was added to indicate this.

Variable 9.04: Allocating Funds

1950-1963: 6
1964-1968: 4
1969-1981: 5
1982-1990: 6

Since the CDU membership was not large, it did not depend on membership dues for the bulk of party funds. Instead, the CDU depended on large institutional contributions which were sometimes allocated to the party through the sponsor associations. Presumably, the federal party organization, in turn, allocated the funds to the various local associations.

"In March 1964, the CDU's Federal Committee produced as official tariff as a 'guide' for members to work out their monthly contributions... It did not, however, directly challenge the voluntary principle... Control of finance, as another indicator of where authority lay in party organization, was not centralized in the CDU. The Landesverbaende but also the district branches, who administered membership subscriptions, had control over a much larger share of the party's total income than did the national party organization." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, pp. 259-60) The regional interests of the CDU held the financial reins of the party after Adenauer retired. There was no extremely strong unifying national force by which to concentrate the funds. -2 in the coding.

"The Constitutional Court prohibits direct public subsidies to parties."
Since 1950, parties had received money directly from the government. The National Executive decided to suspend all membership rights to people who did not pay dues for six months. (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, pp. 336, 385) No coding change; national executive maintains control of smaller amount of money.

Election reimbursement introduced. Parties received a sum of money proportional to the votes they received: DM 2.50 per person. "Only parties with at least 2.5% of second votes or 10% of first votes (if the party did not run a list in a particular Land) are entitled to reimbursement." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 385) No coding change.
"As a result of... opposition, and because of membership drives, membership fees became a more important element of total party income." (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, p. 456) "The minimum subscription is determined by the National Party Congress." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 336) The national organization received large amounts of money which were obtained at lower levels of the party. Coding decreased by 1 to reflect this change in collection of monies.

During the period of opposition there was a high dependency on sponsors to bring in financial support. The party leaders provided members with guides to enable workers to pay membership fees but was not put as mandatory rather still voluntary. This was an attempt to try and raise revenue. (Pridham, Geoffrey. 1977. Christian Democracy in Western Germany. St. Martins's Press, New York. pp. 241-302.) No coding change.

"Independent candidates are also entitled to reimbursement if they win 10% of the vote in their constituency." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 385) The CDU's national organization tried to use its funds to gain votes on the local level any way it could during the Opposition period. No coding change.

"Parties are obliged to disclose their expense accounts... No longer limitation of sums which can be deducted from income tax if they are donated to political parties (indirect public subsidy). Introduction of direct public subsidies, the so-called 'Chancenäusgleich,' which is intended to compensate for the differential chances of political parties to attract donations." (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 385) Newly elected Chancellor Kohl recalled the meager days of opposition and used his new government to increase the CDU's cash flow. The compensation for differences in attracting donations was Kohl's concession to the CDU's new coalition partner, the FDP, which as a tiny party could not attract as much money as the CDU. +1 to show that the CDU reinstated government transfers to parties, reducing the national organizations' need for local membership dues.

"The party finance scandal of the Eighties which exposed several industrialists, made them more careful when giving donations." (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, p. 456) "Best known [among these scandals] have become the huge donations made to the established parties by the Flick concern, which has resulted in the indictment of two former ministers and has the touched the leaders of the FDP, CDU, and SPD alike. A recent ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on party finance, a consequence in part of the scandals arising out of private contributions, probably will have the effect of strengthening public support for parties." (Livinston, Robert, West German Political Parties, 1986, p. 91) The Flick concern sold Mercedes stock to party and government leaders in 1981. The CDU-FDP coalition submitted a bill on party finance reorganization in April 1983. (Beyme, Klaus von, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 1985, p. 200-1) The CDU's desire to get more funding during the late opposition years appeared to have led to some unethical
behavior. The party finance reorganization bill decreased the influence that private sponsors had on the party. No coding alteration needed.

Today, the CDU and its political foundation, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, rely heavily on state funding... Membership fees and regular contributions to the party's central fund made up 44.1% of its income. Three percent came from dividends for party assets, 4.5% was income from other party activities. Financial donations from sources outside the party made up 15.5% of the CDU budget. The party organization at a subnational level contributed 2.8% of the CDU's income, whereas the lion's share of contributions other than membership fees was provided by state funding which accounted for 30.1% of the party's finances (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, p. 456) (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 383-6). No change needed.

Variable 9.05: Formulating Policy

1950-1990: 6

Policy formulation remained in the hands of a small group of party leaders. Only on rare occasions lower level party organizations were able to effectively influence policy formulators.

The Party Council (Bundessausschuss) decided "all organizational and political questions of the national party." The Party Council no longer elected the Treasurer or the Cash Auditor, and received reports from the National Executive at least three times a year. (Katz, Richard, and Mair, Peter, Party Organizations, 1992, p. 353) No coding change.

"At the Hamm congress of the Young Union in November 1969, its newly elected chairman, Juergen Echternach, concentrated his speech on the organizational consequences of the party's role in Opposition:

"At present it [the CDU] appears predominantly as a disorganized, loosely united reservoir of heterogeneous associations and autonomous regional branches... the Federal party and its organizations must become the center of political decision-making in the CDU... that means tightening up the organization and modernizing the party machine." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 261)

The CDU's source of policy, the Party Council, would continue to make policy by default while the main efforts at revitalizing the party occurred on the organizational, not ideological, side. No coding change necessary.

Kurt Beidenkopf [CDU General Secretary] saw the BGS [Bundesgeschaeftstelle, the National Headquarters] more than simply the administrative
center of the party. In his speech to the Hamburg Congress in November 1973, he noted:

"'The Konrad Adenauer House [site of the BGS] in Bonn is the place from which the party will be led.'

"Secondly, the General Secretary under Beidenkopf (1973-7) developed more of a political presence not only as head of the party organization,... but also as policy formulator." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 264) Beidenkopf sought to concentrate policy formation even further than on a simply national level, such as in the party council, but in the office of general secretary. Centralization of policy making remained national. No coding change needed.

There was "intensive debate held within the party on program of fundamental principles prepared by a commission headed by Richard von Weizsaecker... This program was adopted at the national party conference in Ludwigshaven in 1978." (Livingston, Robert, West German Political Parties, 1986, p. 19) The national party conference continued to decide the policy; Weizsaecker's recommendations were approved by it. No coding change.

**Variable 9.06: Controlling Communications**

1950-1968: 7  
1969: 5  
1970-1979: 6  
1980-1990: 7  

Extensive propaganda tools were in the hands of the federal party organization. These include newspapers, magazines, party broadcasts, and speakers. There were similar propaganda tools employed by the regional and local party organizations.

In December 1969, the Ring of Christian Democratic Students (RCDS) called for better communication between the national party and its regional and district branches. Having lost the use of official publicity, the CDU was forced back on its own underdeveloped resources. (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 261) CDU members recognized that the party communication channels were deficient, particularly after the CDU became opposition. -2 to account for the loss of state media channels.

"The Hamburg CDU... still complained as late as 1970 of the lack of suitable personnel and the unreliable methods of communication between the Landesverband office and the [single-member] district branches, especially with regard to the provision of information." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, p. 257) The CDU was improving its media bases, and controlled the amount
of information being disbursed from above, from the national level. +1 to reflect this change.

"In the Federal Republic of Germany... the system gave them [small parties] a disadvantage as compared with the established parties. That was true as far as broadcasting times were concerned, since these are allocated according to previous election results." (Beyme, Klaus von, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 1985, p.208) The government-run media were obligated to provide air time to the larger parties, making the CDU/CSU's communications particularly influential as it was the largest single vote-getting coalition. +1 in coding.

"The media have been accused of influencing the relation between party identification and electoral behavior, and the thesis has been put forward of a 'dual climate of opinion.'" The Christian Democrats argued that the media were generally to the Left. The media were not supposed to have kept their traditional role of 'media' for the parties in the election campaign, although it proved virtually impossible to show that there had been any subversive influence on the electorate. (Beyme, Klaus von, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 1985, p. 300) The CDU felt that the media were skewing news towards its opposition, but there was no evidence to demonstrate this assertion. No coding change.

Variable 9.07: Administering Discipline

1950-1990: 4

Disciplinary measures could have been taken by the appropriate party executive committee. Disciplinary measures include warnings, reprimands, deprivation of party offices, deprivation of eligibility to hold party offices during a specified period of time, and expulsion from the party.

Franz-Josef Strauss was Minister of Defense from 1956-63 in Adenauer's Cabinets. "He had to leave the latter post because of his role in the Spiegel affair, in which the news magazine Der Spiegel was the victim of a raid by the Ministry of Defense after an article it published was interpreted by the Ministry as treasonous." (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, p. 459) The CSU leader stepped down from his government post, but continued to head the CSU. No coding change.

Rainer Barzel, Bundestag Fraktion leader since 1964, altered disciplinary procedures: "In October 1969... a new disciplinary code was introduced to ensure regular attendance and an effective response from backbenchers." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, p. 195) Following the electoral loss to the SPD, the national parliamentary members were reorganized to have a greater visibility, which was necessary since the CDU was now the opposition party. No coding change.
"The party finance scandal of the Eighties which exposed several industrialists, made them more careful when giving donations." (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, p. 456) "Best known [among these scandals] have become the huge donations made to the established parties by the Flick concern, which has resulted in the indictment of two former ministers and has the touched the leaders of the FDP, CDU, and SPD alike. A recent ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on party finance, a consequence in part of the scandals arising out of private contributions, probably will have the effect of strengthening public support for parties." (Livinston, Robert, West German Political Parties, 1986, p. 91) While the national party had disciplinary measures in place, they were not always effective. No coding change.

**Variable 9.08: Leadership Concentration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1965</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1968</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973-1979</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1990</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although a party elite of some 25 men was considered the policy formulators Adenauer was clearly the chief policy maker for the party and the country. Seldom were his policy decisions overruled and his leadership remained essentially unchallenged except for the protestations of the lander chairmen regarding the increasing centralization of power under Adenauer.

After Konrad Adenauer stepped down as party chair in 1966 and retired from public life, the CDU had no clear leader. "The fundamental differences in opinions that occurred therefore developed into an embarrassing slanging match between various CDU/CSU leaders. These tended to reflect the intense personal rivalries of the immediate post-Adenauer years, since Erhard's weak leadership indicated that he would be no more than a stopgap Chancellor." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 144) Adenauer's departure meant that his cult of personality fell apart, leaving no authoritative spokespersons. While the Chancellor remained CDU (Kurt-Georg Kiesinger), the Grand Coalition position was detrimental to the CDU's leaders' authority. Coding dropped by 3 to show this leadership vacuum.

"At the Hamm congress of the Young Union in November 1969, its newly elected chairman, Juergen Echternach, concentrated his speech on the organizational consequences of the party's role in Opposition:

'At present it [the CDU] appears predominantly as a disorganized, loosely united reservoir of heterogeneous associations and autonomous regional branches... the
Federal party and its organizations must become the center of political decision-making." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 260)
Following the loss of the Chancellorship, the CDU did not even have a prominent voice in the Government to act as its leader. -1 on the coding.

Fraktion leader Rainer "Barzel's image among party supporters improved during 1971, as it became clear that he would become the next CDU chairman." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, p. 195) The Fraktion leader was the position most in the public eye, and Barzel could speak for the Fraktion, thus deriving power from his (albeit Opposition) place in the federal government's functioning. +2 to account for the rise of a centralization of power in the Fraktion and in Barzel's hands.

"Kurt Beidenkopf [CDU General Secretary] saw the BGS [Bundesgeschäfstitelle, the National Headquarters] more than simply the administrative center of the party. In his speech to the Hamburg Congress in November 1973, he noted:

'The Konrad Adenauer House [site of the BGS] in Bonn is the place from which the party will be led.'" (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977) Secretary Beidenkopf felt that the CDU's best route out of its Opposition role was to concentrate authority in extra-parliamentary areas, not in the Fraktion. No coding change.

Barzel's resignation from his Fraktion leader and CDU chair posts ended the union of the two jobs. He had supported West German entry into the UN, but his own Fraktion voted 101-93 against the proposal. "The separation of the two... resulted in the election of Karl Carstens as Fraktion leader and Helmut Kohl as CDU chairman and so created the opportunity for such a development, as did the fact that the issue over the successor for the CDU chairmanship was treated for the first time in the party's history as separate from that of the Chancellor candidacy." (Pridham, Geoffrey, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, 1977, pp. 211-2, 233) Kohl appointed Kurt Beidenkopf from North Rhineland-Westphalia, Barzel's home base, as the CDU general secretary. Leadership became extra-parliamentary with Kohl's and Beidenkopf's assumption of power. +1 on the coding.

Leadership remained between two individuals, but Franz-Josef Strauss of the CSU had become the other leader besides Kohl. The 1978 Ludwigshafen congress highlighted Strauss' new authority. Strauss wanted to run the 1980 election campaign completely opposing both the SPD and the FDP, while Kohl favored a conciliatory relationship with the FDP. (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, pp. 454-5) No coding change; leadership stayed dual.

Strauss was nominated as the CDU/CSU's Chancellor candidate to oppose SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. He tried to eliminate the FDP as a rival, but lost the election. Kohl had put Heiner Geissler, a progressive Christian Democrat from
Rhineland-Palatinate, in the position of general secretary, in 1978. Geissler exerted his power and replaced Strauss as (besides Kohl) the other leading voice of the CDU. (Jacobs, Francis, Western European Political Parties, 1989, p. 453, 455). +1 in recognition of Geissler's new standing. He and Kohl had been close compatriots during their stays in their respective Laender and during their rise in the BGS in Bonn.

Kohl wrapped himself "in the mantle of Konrad Adenauer and sometimes calling himself Adenauer's political grandson." "With most economic indicators strong, the government seems virtually unassailable." (Livingston, Robert, West German Political Parties, 1986, pp. 83, 89) Kohl's self-description was accurate, as can be seen from the coding. He remained the sole leader of the party, whose approval was required for proposals submitted by other CDU or government officers. No change.
Variable 9.01: Nationalization of Structure

1950-1956: 3
1957-1979: 5
1980-1990: 3


In its decentralized structure, the FDP appeared to some observers as resembling a cartel of state party organizations during the fifties. No information was found for this variable prior to 1980. For this reason it is difficult to pinpoint when the FDP shifted back to a more decentralized structure. Most sources agree that the local parties did not have to be entirely responsive to the national organization. This is most evident because in the Laender the FDP does not necessarily follow the same coalition pattern as the national party. The regional parties respond more to election results than to the national party organization. [by Christy Hartung]

FDP is a nationwide party with weak organization especially in LAENDER where party support is low (Delury, 1983, p.367). [by Christy Hartung]

Party organization is too decentralized and subject to regional or local pressures (Johnson, 1983, p.43) The FDP organizational structure is decentralized and most tightly woven at the land level. [by Christy Hartung]

"The FDP is built upon eleven Landesverbande (state organizations), which are only loosely co-ordinated from Bonn" (Padgett, 1986, p.156) "The state party organizations vary in the influence which they are able to exert on the national party, with North Rhine/Westphalia and Baden-Wuerttemberg as the most influential."
(Padgett, 1986, p.156) "The autonomy of the state parties from Bonn is typified by their coalition policy in Land election and legislatures. " (Padgett, 1986, p.157) "The
weakness of the central party apparatus is compounded by the skeletal nature of party organization in the country" (Padgett, 1986, p.157). [by Christy Hartung]

"It has established the usual panoply of committees, congresses and an executive, but the almost constant involvement in government has given the parliamentary party, and the leadership elite in particular, an overwhelming degree of authority to take even crucial decisions, without invoking the formal consultative process implied by the party structure" (Kirchner & Broughton, 1988, p.68). [by Florence Adam]

**Variable 9.02: Selecting the National Leader**

**1950-1990: 3**


Although one source (Keesings, 22300B) stated that the federal executive chooses the leader, all other sources agree that the FDP leaders are chosen at the party convention. [by Christy Hartung]

Dr. Mende informed the party executive that he would not be a candidate for reelection because he accepted the directorship of a private company. The federal executive selected Herr Walter Scheel to succeed him (Keesings, 1967, p.22300B). [by Christy Hartung]

In January, Scheel was officially elected at the party conference (Keesings, 1968, p.22508A). [by Christy Hartung]

"Depending on membership figures and the number of votes cast for the FDP in the most recent federal election, each state branch is entitled to send a certain number of delegates to the annual federal congress (which chooses the FDP's federal executive and decides the party's policy)" (Haussmann, 1986, p.44). [by Christy Hartung]

**Variable 9.03: Selecting Parliamentary Candidates**

**1950-1953: 5**

**1954-1990: 6**
BY LAW, NOMINATIONS FOR CONSTITUENCY SEATS WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONSTITUENCY PARTY ASSOCIATIONS. HOWEVER, SINCE 1953, THE FDP WON ALMOST NO SEATS IN CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS AND DEPENDED ON LIST CANDIDATES, WHICH ARE NAMED IN CONVENTION AT THE LANDER LEVEL WITH SOME SORT OF NATIONAL REVIEW. THE CODE FOR THE FIRST THREE YEARS, THEN, RECOGNIZED SOME CONSTITUENCY ASSOCIATION PARTICIPATION ON CANDIDATE SELECTION. THAT FOR THE SECOND HALF RECOGNIZED THE JOINT ROLES OF THE LAND AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

"There is no explicit rule for candidate selection. According to electoral law, constituency assembly or a constituency assembly of delegates has to have a secret vote on the constituency candidate" (Katz & Mair, 1992, p.370). [by Florence Adam]

The procedure for selection of parliamentary candidate is set by law.
"Under this system, voters cast a 'first vote' for a candidate in the voter's home district and a 'second vote' for a state list drawn up by the party." (Livingston, 1986, p.2)

During this time period, the FDP has not been strong enough for their direct candidates to win (Livingston, 1986, p.80). [by Christy Hartung]

Variable 9.04: Allocating Funds

1950-1967: 5  
1968-1982: 3  
1983-1990: 5

PARTY COVERED ITS EXPENSES WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE LAND ASSOCIATIONS, VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, AND RECEIPTS FROM PUBLICATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND EVENTS. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DETERMINED THE CONTRIBUTION LEVELS FOR THE LAND ASSOCIATIONS AND THE POWER TO PENALIZE A LAND ASSOCIATION FOR FAILURE TO MEET ITS CONTRIBUTION DUTY RESTED WITH THE FEDERAL PARTY.

"The monthly membership fee is at least 2 DM as a general rule for all Land party organizations, but national party gets no share" (Katz & Mair, 1992, p.338) [since the money is collected by regional organs, and is not transferred to the national party: -2 points]. [by Florence Adam]

"In 1982, the FDP's total income of DM 22.7 million was made up as follows: 35.0% from dues and subscriptions, 19.0 % from other contributions, 28.7 % from the state, and 17.3 % from other miscellaneous sources" (Kirchner & Broughton, 1988, p.90). [by Florence Adam]
"The share of the Land party organizations paid to the national party is 1 DM per month per member." (Katz & Mair, 1992, p. 338). [There is a coding change here because now part of the regionally collected funds is submitted to the national party]. [by Florence Adam]

"The FDP is still able to attract financial support from some of the biggest business conglomerates in the country. Although the party is heavily dependent on the reimbursement of election costs by the state, they have also received considerable funds from firms such as Horten as a result of their unambiguously free-market economic policies and fiscal policies designed to encourage growth and prosperity" (Kirchner & Broughton, 1988, p.68). [by Florence Adam]

Variable 9.05: Formulating Policy

1950-1956: 0
1957-1979: 5
1980-1990: 6

During the first half the party maintained only a nominal national organization, and the supra-Land apparatus functioned as a "roof organization" rather than as a true national unit. Essentially, policies determined in the state offices and among Bundestag delegates rather than by discussion with rank and file. During second half, national organization began to clearly articulate FDP policies. National organization increased in power under the leadership of Eric Mende.

There is wide disagreement over this variable. Some sources emphasize that the party convention sets the policy, while others say that the leaders dictate the policy. It can be assumed that the party convention sets the policy except in extenuating circumstances such as in 1982. [by Ken Janda]

"Such actions [acknowledgment of a 'fait accompli'] suggest an almost complete lack of influence by the ordinary members on the party's overall direction, an impression reinforced by the fact that coalition changes in 1969 and 1982 were accompanied by substantial numbers of members leaving the FDP (about 29,000 and 9,000 respectively) rather than staying and arguing for their particular coalition preference" (Kirchner & Broughton, 1988, p.68). [by Florence Adam]

Because of the concentration of power in the leadership elite (Praesidium, Minister, and parliament) and of the frequent government participation of the FDP, the party is often described as a "Minister Party" (Stoss, 1984, p.1375) [1 point because the decision-making elite is Praesidium, Minister, parliament]. [by Florence Adam]
"In decisions over major questions of the FDPs future, however, top leadership bodies tend to be either bypassed or manipulated by FDP ministers in Bonn. The decision to leave the Social Liberal coalition in 1982, for instance, was the culmination of a long series of moves by Genscher (principally) and Lambsdorff" (Padgett, 1986, p.159) "The autonomy of party leaders was vividly apparent in the decision to end the coalition with the SPD in 1982. Only a handful of FDP leaders were involved in the decision, which was then presented to the rest of the party as a fait accompli." (Dalton, 1989, p.276). [by Florence Adam]

The FDP leadership withdrew its support for a bill that would give amnesty to tax evaders because 7 of the 11 regional bodies opposed the legislation (Keesings, 33239). But this appears to have been a political decision rather than one dictated by power. [by Christy Hartung]

"It [the FDP] has established the usual panoply of committees, congresses and an executive, but the almost constant involvement in government has given the parliamentary party, and the leadership elite in particular, an overwhelming degree of authority to take even crucial decisions, without evoking the formal consultative process implied by the party's structure" (Kirchner & Broughton, 1988, p.68). "Nevertheless, the considerable flexibility at the very centre of the FDP's approach to electoral politics in its development as a voter's party heavily dependent on leadership cues has given room for manoeuvre denied to other parties with more rigidly structured organisations and stronger ties to particular social groups. This adaptability has been vital to the party's success over the post-war period (Kirchner & Broughton, 1988, p.85) [+1 for the importance of the elite]. [by Florence Adam]

"The membership plays only a minor role in party decision making. Party elites are often free to act as they choose, without the internal party controls implied in the party government model (Dalton, 1989, p.276). [by Christy Hartung]

Variable 9.06: Controlling Communications

1950-1963: 7
1964-1970: 0
1971-1974: 3
1975-1990: 7

THE FDP CARRIED ON EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS ON A NATIONAL LEVEL. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN 1957 WHEN THE PARTY DECIDED NOT TO ENTER A COALITION WITH THE CDU.

It seems as if there was a shift toward the centralization of communications in the 80's. This is most likely due to the weak strength of the party at the local level. [by Christy Hartung]
The publication of the 'Freie Wort', a weekly paper of the central organ, has to be stopped for financial reasons (Stoss, 1984, p.1376). [There is no evidence of any other publication still existing. The FDP has no more control over any media]. [by Florence Adam]

Regarding its relations with the press sector, the FDP has been described as a party that wasted and did not take advantage of the available resources (Stoss, 1984, p. 1376). [by Florence Adam]

The National Parliamentary Party started the publication of the 'Neuen Bonner Depesche' (Stoss, 1984, p. 1378). [by Florence Adam]

The National Party changed the 'Die Neuen Bonner Depesche' into a national party paper that is sent to all the members for no extra charge (Stoss, 1984, p.1378). [by Florence Adam]

The Berlin Land Organization has its own party paper, the 'Berliner Liberale Zeitung'. The 'Neuer Bonner Depesche has evolved into an influential member magazine (Stoss, 1984, p.1378) The FDP is against political use of radio and TV. Therefore it refuses to make use of it for its own political means (Party Manifesto, 1980, p.621). [by Florence Adam]

"The federal party must consequently step in to assist with many promotional burdens that the state organizations can no longer carry by themselves" (See, 1985, p.165). I kept the coding at 7, because there is no evidence that the party stopped their publications, and therefore FDP has still strong control over the printed media. [by Florence Adam]

Variable 9.07: Administering Discipline

1950-1990: 2

The FDP group in the Lantag of North Rhine-Westphalia expelled three of its 11 members after they joined the National Liberal Action Group (Keesings, 24415A). [by Christy Hartung]

"A special party congress was called in Berlin to sanction single-handed policy-making of FDP leadership, and to endorse the new party coalition" (Kolinsky, 1984, p.116). [by Kyle Schueneman]

Variable 9.08: Leadership Concentration
"Formally, the top decision-making bodies are the party Executive and Praesidium. The Executive consists of around 35 members, the majority of whom are elected by the party congress" (Padgett, 1986, p.159). Both of these organizations have been dominated by government minister, leaders of the party's Bundestag Fraktion and minister in Lander governments" (Padgett, 1986, p.159). "In decisions over major questions of the FDPs future, however, top leadership bodies tend to be either bypassed or manipulated by FDP ministers in Bonn. The decision to leave the Social Liberal coalition in 1982, for instance, was the culmination of a long series of moves by Genscher (principally) and Lambsdorff" (Padgett, 1986, p.159).[by Christy Hartung] I changed the coding to 5, because the formal structure of leadership concentration was not applied, and the power rested in the hands of Genscher and Lambsdorff. [by Florence Adam]
Variable 9.01: Nationalization of Structure

1980-1990: 3

A basic pillar of the Greens is grassroots politics (called "basisdemokratie"). "Though the general structure resembles that of the established German parties (with organs at the national, state and local levels), the power distribution is very different. Instead of answering to the national level, the state and local branches of the Greens are given complete autonomy 'regarding program, finances, and personnel'. Furthermore, in keeping with the idea that the party is an extension of the movement, the local level is to be the most powerful, and ideally would have the greatest resources and the most responsibilities" (Harmel 1987:24, also, see Frankland 1989b:387). The code is "3" because there are discernible national party organs but they are not superior to local organizations. Overall, the Greens emphasize "grassroots-democratic politics (which) means an increased realization of decentralized, direct democracy" (Spretnak and Capra 1986:37).

The code remains unchanged; however, it should be noted that several factions form due to disputes over the grassroots principle (see Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:114-5).

Variable 9.02: Selecting the National Leader

1980-1990: 0

The Greens institute collective leadership where there is not one individual who acts as a party leader. This is done in order to avoid the formation of an oligarchy (see Harmel 1987). "The Green Party is afraid of hierarchical structures which would stipulate the aim of a democratic party structure" (Dittmers 1988:5). They want to prevent the rise of a charismatic leader (although several charismatic figures have been notable in the Greens such as the late Petra Kelley). Harmel explains, "As one inhibitor of oligarchization, the leadership of the Greens was made undeniably 'collective'. To the extent that it is even reasonable to speak of a 'top' in such an arrangement, it is occupied by the three speakers of the extraparliamentary organization and, when the party holds seats, three speakers of the parliamentary group" (Harmel 1987:24-5).

Additionally, the Greens instituted a rotation system which requires "Bundestag representatives to give up their seats after two years of a four-year term to make way for fellow Greens who were lower on the list" (Harmel 1987:25).

In 1986, the Greens abandon the rotation principle for parliamentary deputies (Frankland 1989a:66). However, the leadership remains collective.
Variable 9.03: Selecting Parliamentary Candidates

1980-1990: 3

The selection of the list candidates takes place by a secret vote in a Land Conference of Delegates (Poguntke and Boll 1992:371). The list candidates are the most important because the Greens have only won seats via the lists (they have never won a constituency). The selection of constituency candidates takes place in a constituency assembly where individual party members can participate in the election of the candidates (Poguntke and Boll 1992: 371). Thus, although the main decisions are made by delegates in the Land Conferences, individual party members do play a role in the selection process of the constituency candidates. The national organization has no role (Poguntke and Boll 1992:371). A score of "3" seems most appropriate (although it does not capture the process perfectly). Poguntke and Boll (1992:371) report no change in this process.

Variable 9.04: Allocating Funds

1980-1990: 0

"Local groups collect party dues via a sliding scale of 5 to 20 DM per month. Of that, usually 4 DM are sent to the state office, which in turn forwards 2 DM to the national office. The state office then distributes most of its share to the county groups (Spretnak and Capra 1986:243). Accordingly, the code should be either "1" or "2". However, the vast majority (over half) of the funds comes from the state via campaign reimbursements; "membership contributions have represented a significantly smaller percentage of the Greens' total income than has been the case with other Bundestag parties" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:109, also see Frankland 1989a:67, Dittmers 1988:6, and Poguntke and Boll 1992:377). This money goes to the national or state organization. However, "according to the federal charter, the local and state associations have the 'greatest possible autonomy' regarding finances" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1993:106). According to Poguntke and Boll (1992:383), the Greens central office expenditure has consistently been much less than their total expenditure. Thus, allocation appears to be diffused throughout the party. There also exists a fund, "oeko-Fonds", where Green Bundestag deputies were required to give up most of their generous salaries to state level organizations to set up "alternative projects" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:109). Overall, it is difficult to code this variable; either code "0" or code "5" seems appropriate. I have chosen "0" because the lack of clarity on allocation and because collection seems to take place at all levels (at least in some regard). There is no sign that this code changes.
Variable 9.05: Formulating Policy

1980-1990: 2

"The policy formulation process of the Greens required repeated referral of matters back to the local party and local movement activists for deliberations." (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:110). "Comparing with the major parties, the Greens' federal and state party assemblies have been generally characterized by vigorous participation in deciding policy decisions. During the 1980s the Greens were the most decentralized of the parties represented in the Bundestag" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:111, Frankland 1989a:65-6). Additionally, in their expert survey, Laver and Hunt ask about the influence of leaders, legislators, and activists in the formulation of party policy (Laver and Hunt 1992:124). A score of "20" is representative of maximum influence while a score of "1" denotes "no influence at all". Green activists receive a "13.58" which is the highest score reported among German parties (for activists) while the Green leaders receive a "9.53" which is the lowest score among German parties (for leaders) (Laver and Hunt 1992:199). Clearly, there is decentralization of policy formulation; there is no indication of a change.

Throughout the 1980s, the federal party leadership often tried to "influence state party decisionmaking about strategy toward the SPD (in terms of coalition formation). In these cases, the state parties successfully defended their autonomy against Bonn" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:111).

Variable 9.06: Controlling Communications

1980-1990: 4

"The Greens are committed to relaying privileged information that usually does not get outside the forums of power. Indeed, they have become skilled communicators. All levels of the party produce a flood of printed material" (Spretnak and Capra 1986:131). "The national headquarters in Bonn produces a monthly bulletins as well as frequent Pressespiegel, that is, collections of photocopied newspaper articles about the Greens. There are also plans for a national party magazine" (Spretnak and Capra 1986:133). "Most of the Green Fraktion groups in the state legislatures produce monthly bulletins" (Spretnak and Capra 1986:132). "Publications of the party include newsletters at the local and county level published at two-to six-week intervals" (Spretnak and Capra 1986:132). The Greens distribute policy statements on a regular basis as well as programs in both German and English. Thus, control of the media is distributed throughout all levels; it seems influential. This has been a consistent feature of the Greens.

Variable 9.07: Administering Discipline

1980-1982: 0
1983-1990: 3

Because the Greens are not represented in the Bundestag, it is unclear if there exist any techniques for administering discipline.

In 1983, as the Greens enter the Bundestag for the first time, they "embrace the concept of imperatives Mandat, which requires the resignation of any deputy who deviates from policy resolutions of the party assembly" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:108, Frankland 1989a:66). "Direct control over the parliamentary group is implemented through the requirement that all representatives make a full accounting of their activities and through the 'imperative mandate'. The latter, in effect since 1983, provides that 'the group in parliament is obligated to obey all resolutions and decisions passed by the federal assembly of the federal committee' under penalty of expulsion" (Harmel 1987:25, Mewes 1987:116). The change comes due to the electoral success of winning parliamentary seats.

In 1988, a faction within the Greens (called Gruner Aufbruch '88) calls for the liberalization of the "imperatives Mandat" (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:114). However, they are unable to change the rule, so the code does not change.

Variable 9.08: Leadership Concentration

1980-1982: 2
1983-1990: 1

"As one inhibitor to oligarchization, the leadership of the Greens was made undeniably 'collective' (i.e., 'unconcentrated'). 'Fragmentation of power prevails. The party is governed, first, by decisions of the federal delegate assembly that meets annually and consists of delegates from local and county groups. A federal committee, with 50 elected members meets about every six weeks. A federal executive committee, consisting of 11 members and 3 co-chairpersons, is elected annually by the delegates' assembly and meets two or three times during six week intervals. In addition, the representatives of the Greens in the federal parliament elect their own leadership.' To the extent that it is even reasonable to speak of 'top' in such an arrangement, it is occupied by the three speakers of the extraparliamentary organization and, when the party holds seats, three speakers of the parliamentary group" (Harmel 1987:24-5, Mewes 1987:116, Frankland 1989a:65). Clearly, the leadership is dispersed and decentralized among various organs; the Greens take all possible measures to avoid charismatic leadership that is concentrated (see Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992:106). However, the presence of spokes people make some type of leadership identifiable. Because the Greens are not represented in parliament until 1983, the code is "2"; there are three non-binding spokes people.

In 1983, as the Greens enter parliament, three spokes people from the parliamentary group join with the three spokes people from the extraparliamentary organization. This leads to a group of six, and thus, changes the code. The change is due to the electoral success of winning seats in parliament.
Variable 9.01: Nationalization of Structure

1950-1990: 5

THE SPD STRUCTURE IS HIERARCHICAL WITH AT LEAST THREE IDENTIFIABLE LEVELS OF ORGANIZATIONS--FEDERAL PARTY, DISTRICT, LOCAL ASSOCIATIONS.


The SPD has a hierarchical structure with at least four identifiable levels of organization--Federal, Regional, District, and Local (Katz and Mair, 1992, pg. 341). [Jeff Swaddling]

Variable 9.02: Selecting the National Leader

1950-1990: 3


After the creation of the praesidium in 1958, the status of highest party organ in the SPD shifted from the executive committee to the eleven-member praesidium. Thus, after 1958, the national SPD party leader would be considered the chairman of the praesidium. The chairman of the executive committee, however, is automatically appointed the chairman of the praesidium. Since the chairman of the praesidium is always a member of the executive committee and the members of the executive committee are all elected at the biennial party convention, then indirectly, the chairman of the praesidium is chosen by the party convention. As mentioned before, the SPD party convention is composed of regional delegates. Therefore, coding remains the same. [by Jeff Swaddling]
Directly, however, the SPD executive committee chairperson is elected in an open ballot by the members of the executive committee. A majority of the votes is necessary to become elected. If candidates reach the same number of votes without reaching a majority, there will be a run-off. In the case of a second tie, a lot will be drawn. The executive committee nominates candidates for the election. In addition, the party convention can nominate candidates until at least one day before the ballot (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 349). [by Jeff Swaddling]

Elections for the offices in the executive committee are changed from open elections to secret ballot elections (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 349). [by Jeff Swaddling]

In the case of a run-off election, a majority of the votes is no longer required. In a SPD decision in 1971, the party changed the election requirements to call for a plurality, not a majority, in second votes. Also, nomination of candidates for offices in the executive committee was required to be published in the SPD newspaper, 'Vowaerts', three weeks in advance of the election. (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 349). [by Jeff Swaddling]

Nomination rules again change slightly and candidate nominations must be published 4 weeks in advance in the SPD newspaper, up from three weeks in 1971 (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 349). [by Jeff Swaddling]

Per Braunthal, the chairman of the executive committee is also the chairman of the Praesidium. [by Scott Case]

**Variable 9.03: Selecting Parliamentary Candidates**

**1950-1990: 5**

*BY LAW, NOMINATIONS FOR CONSTITUENCY SEATS WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONSTITUENCY PARTY ASSOCIATION. HOWEVER, THE SPD REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT CAME MOSTLY FROM LIST RATHER THAN DISTRICT SEATS. THE LIST NOMINATIONS WERE MADE BY THE LAND ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS, WITH SOME NATIONAL ADVICE GIVEN ON SELECTION.*

"The electoral system enables both the local branches and the regional organizations of all parties to participate in the nomination process" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 179) Nominations are made for both a single-member district candidate as well as a Land level party slate, which is comprised of a list of several national and regional party candidates. In nominating district candidates, "local branches elect delegates to the local conference, their number based on the branch's number of dues-paying members" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 179). Nominations of candidates for the Land slate are
made by a Land delegate conference, which is comprised of regional party representatives. However, even though parliamentary candidates are selected locally and regionally, via members of the nomination conferences, the SPD national executive committee provides some strong "recommendations" concerning who the members of the nomination conferences should choose. "The national party guidelines insist that only those who are indispensable to the Franktion or who by being well-known could attract voter support should be nominated" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 179). For all intents and purposes, the national executive committee approves the nominations made by the local and regional conventions. In addition, the executive committee can veto district constituency candidates and call for a second vote. All in all, this system warrants a coding of 5. [by Jeff Swaddling]

"In 1965, contests between rival nominees occurred in only 23 out of 243 districts" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 179). This confirms the fact that candidates for nomination for the Bundestag are "recommended" by the SPD national executive committee, even though they are officially chosen by local and regional nominating convention committees. [by Jeff Swaddling]

Also according to law, district candidates choose their candidates at delegate conferences. Branches elect delegates to the local conference, their number based on the branch's number of dues paying members. Nomination to the Bundestag slate is by secret ballot, with the winner needing a plurality to become the party's candidate. According to party guidelines, district candidates should be picked on the basis of competence and ability to represent the party in public. Women and persons with special expertise needed in the Fraktion should be especially considered. (Braunthal, 1983, p. 179) [by Scott Case]

Variable 9.04: Allocating Funds

1950-1990: 2

THE DISTRICTS WERE IN CHARGE OF DUES COLLECTION, WHILE THE FEDERAL PARTY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUCH OF THAT MONEY, ALONG WITH ANY OUTSIDE CONTRIBUTIONS.

In 1977, the SPD party income had risen to over 106 million DM, largely because of a sharp increase in income from membership dues, which accounted for over have of the party's total income (56 million DM). These membership dues are collected via districts and/or the local branches. The party's national executive receives 15% of SPD membership dues each year. (Braunthal, 1983, p.31) Although it is not clear from the literature whether the local branches or the district organizations actually collect the membership dues, it seems appropriate to keep the party coded at 2 because it is clear that party funds are collected mainly at lower levels and are transmitted upward for distribution by both districts and the national party organs. [by
In 1982, to gain more commitment from members, the party emphasized that 85 percent of dues remained at the district and local levels, with the district deciding how much would go to local branches (normally 20%), the subdistricts and itself. (Braunthal, 1983, p. 31) [by Scott Case]

In 1989, total SPD income is 258,008,137 DM. Over 120 million DM are membership fees and payments from office holders (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 377). This means that nearly 20 million DM in membership fees collected at local and district levels are then distributed upward to the SPD executive committee for distribution. [by Jeff Swaddling]

**Variable 9.05: Formulating Policy**

1950-1966: 5  
1967-1990: 6


Until 1958 the executive was the policymaking organ, but since then, it has become the passive recipient of information from the praesidium. Praesidium is composed of a "rump praesidium" of six core members: chairman, deputy chairs, secretary, treasurer and the Fraktion chairman. In addition, five other party members are elected to the praesidium. Even though there is a change in responsibility, the coding remains the same because for major policy changes, an affirmative vote from the party convention is necessary. [by Scott Case]

"According to the Party Law of 1967 and the SPD statute, the party convention is nominally the highest organ, but, as noted, in practice the praesidium is the body formulating policy...One nonleft SPD observer concurred, 'The party
conventions have primarily a symbolic character; to determine the party policy, however, is not their task" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 21). In this case, the one point coding change reflects the shift in control of party policy formulation from the convention members to the executive and the praesidium as stated in the Party Law. [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1968, the SPD executive committee can no longer decide upon candidate nomination in the case of disagreements (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 349). The executive committee and the praesidium are still the major organs through which party policy is formulated, however. [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1971, the party executive is also given the responsibility of formulating policy for and controlling the structure of the SPD ancillary associations, or Arbeitsgemeinschaften (Katz and Mair, 1992, p. 349). [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1979, Executive Committee expands from 32 to 36 seats. [by Scott Case]

As noted by Braunthal, in 1982, although conventions are not the center for formulating party policy, they may provide some programmatic direction and stimulus to policymakers at the national level. However, the fact remains that, "...the conventions play a limited role in policymaking" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 22). [by Jeff Swaddling]

Variable 9.06: Controlling Communications

1950-1990: 7

THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION CONTROLLED A VAST MEDIA NETWORK WHICH INCLUDED THE PARTY YEARBOOK, THE INTERNAL PARTY MAGAZINE, VARIOUS ELECTRONIC MEDIA CAMPAIGNS, AND GENERAL PUBLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION. THE PARTY PUBLISHED A MONTHLY MAGAZINE DIE DEMOKRATISCHE GEMEINDE.

In 1973, a lively journal "Einblick" was first published by the SPD. The free monthly magazine was an effort by the national SPD headquarters to close the communication gap between the national party leaders and the party members (Braunthal, 1983, p. 53). [by Jeff Swaddling]

"Vorwaerts", a weekly publication of the SPD, increased circulation through the introduction of a streamlined format and reached a circulation of nearly 60,000 copies (Braunthal, 1983, p. 53). [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1982, per Braunthal, several journals and pamphlets are published. In
addition the party maintains its contribution for a weekly newspaper entitled "Vorwaerts". The party also issues "Die Neue Gesellschaft", a theoretical monthly journal containing occasional critical articles. The Land district secretaries also serve as a network link for maintaining an effective means of communication. [by Scott Case]

Variable 9.07: Administering Discipline

1950-1990: 4

THE PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAD BROAD DISCIPLINARY POWERS WHICH INCLUDED SUMMARY EXPULSION WITH NO RIGHT OF DEFENSE OR APPEAL.

In 1982, the Bundesschiedskommission, a seven-member arbitration commission, rules on issues of discipline. Penalties range from censure, prohibition against holding party office and suspension of membership rights all the way up to expulsion. Most of the activities of the commission were during the 70's when many left-wing members of the party were active. For instance, during the period 1977-1979, it dealt with the cases of fifty-eight members, thirty of whom were subsequently expelled. [by Scott Case]

The national arbitration commission in the SPD deals with disputes over the statute and over the guidelines of constituent groups. Other arbitration committees at lower levels also exist and are very similar in structure and function to the national arbitration commission. However, major SPD disciplinary techniques are administered by the national commission. (Braunthal, 1983, p. 23). [by Jeff Swaddling]

Variable 9.08: Leadership Concentration

1950-1990: 3

THE SPD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WAS A HIGHLY HOMOGENEOUS GROUP DOMINATED BY NO ONE PERSONALITY OR GROUP, IN CONTRAST WITH THE INNER ELITE OF THE CDU. COLLEGIAL LEADERSHIP WAS THE RULE AFTER THE DEATH OF KURT SCHUMACHER IN 1952.

After the creation of the party praesidium in 1958, it was clear that the party leadership was concentrated between the elite group elected to the praesidium and the members of the executive committee. Leadership in the SPD was still collectively centralized however. [by Jeff Swaddling]

In a 1968 survey, 26% of the SPD party members believed that they had
no influence on the national party leaders (Braunthal, 1983, p. 78). This supports the coding that leadership is collectively centralized in the party. [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1969, although the functions of the Executive and the praesidium are formally different, "the fact of a very considerable overlapping membership makes the latter organ supreme both in laying down parliamentary tactics and in running the party organization" (Henig, 1969, p. 36). [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1982, "Although the thousands of leaders at all levels of the party affect the direction it takes, the Praesidium and executive in Bonn provides the greatest impetus and initiatives" Braunthal, 1983, p. 66). Therefore, leadership is still collectively centralized among these two national organs. [by Jeff Swaddling]

In 1983, "The top leaders pay lip service the theory of maximum intraparty democracy but in practice pay less attention to it" (Braunthal, 1983, p. 79). [by Jeff Swaddling]