### Supplementary Materials: Electoral Accountability in the Developing World

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#### - APPENDIX 1 -

Surveys included in the analysis

#### Latin America (214 surveys) – www.latinobarometro.org

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004,

2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009

Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,

Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela: 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005,

2006, 2007, 2008, 2009

Dominican Republic: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009

## Africa (64 surveys) – www.afrobarometer.org

Benin, Madagascar: 2005, 2008

Botswana: 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008

Burkina Faso, Liberia: 2008

Cape Verde, Ghana: 2002, 2005, 2008

Kenya: 2003, 2005, 2008

Lesotho: 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008

Malawi: 1999, 2003, 2008

Mali: 2001, 2002, 2005, 2008

Mozambique: 2002, 2005, 2008

Namibia: 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008

Nigeria: 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008

Senegal: 2002, 2005, 2008

South Africa: 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008

Tanzania: 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008

Uganda: 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008

Zambia: 1999, 2003, 3005, 2009

Zimbabwe: 1999, 2005

## Asia (8 surveys) – www.asianbarometer.org

Hong Kong: 2001

Mongolia: 2001, 2006

Philippines: 2005

South Korea: 2003

Taiwan, Thailand: 2006

## Middle East and North Africa (7 surveys) – www.arabbarometer.org

Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Palestine: 2006

Lebanon, Yemen: 2007

- APPENDIX 2 -

Survey questions used in the analysis

Dependent variable

**VOTE**: "If elections were held next Sunday, for which party would you vote?" or "If a

presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?"

Responses are political parties or candidates. Coded "1" for incumbent party/candidate, otherwise

"0". "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as "0."

**APPROV**: In Africa: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have

performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to

say: [President/Prime Minister's name]?" In the Arab World: "Indicate how satisfied you are with

the performance of the current [respondent's country] government." In Asia: "How satisfied or

dissatisfied are you with the [name of president, etc. ruling current] government?" In Latin

America: "Do you approve or disapprove of the current administration headed by (NAME OF

PRESIDENT)?" Coded "1" (approve), "0" (disapprove). "Don't know" and "No response"

recoded as missing.

*Independent variables* 

**ECONOMY**: Both retrospective and prospective evaluations were used. "Looking back, how do

you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country?"

and "Do you think that in 12 months, in general, the country's economic situation will be 'a lot

better', 'a little better', 'the same', 'a little worse' or 'a lot worse'?" Responses to both questions

are coded "1" (worse) to "3" (better). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**AGE**: in years, values below 18 recoded as missing.

**GENDER**: dummy variable where "1" is female and "0" is male.

<sup>1</sup> Recoding "Don't know" and "No response" as missing resulted in the exclusion of too many cases. We compared the results obtained using both strategies and found that it did not affect the magnitude nor the statistical significance of the ECONOMY variable. The same justification applies to the variable INCUMID.

**EDUC**: recoded into three dummy variables identifying respondents with at least some primary (PRIMARY), at last some secondary (SECONDARY), and at least some post-secondary (UNIVERSITY). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**INCUMID**: If the respondent feels close to any particular political party. "Which party is that?" Responses are political parties. Coded "1" for incumbent party, otherwise "0". "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as "0" (see footnote 1).

**LEFTRIGHT**: "People often talk about 'left' and 'right' in politics. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10?" Responses are coded "0" (left) to "10" (right). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**CRIME**: "Have you or one of your relatives been victim of an assault, an aggression or a crime in the last twelve months?" Responses are coded "1" (yes) or "0" (no). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**RURAL**: Coded "1" for rural primary sampling unit, otherwise "0."

**CORPRES**: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President and Officials in his/her Office?" Responses are coded "1" (some, most or all of them) or "0" (none). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**MAJET**: "What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group." Responses are tribe or ethnic groups. Coded "1" for majority ethnic group, otherwise "0." "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**CONFPOL**: "How much trust do you have in political parties?" Responses are coded "1" (trust) or 0 (no trust). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**DEM**: "Which of the following sentences do you most agree with? 'Democracy is better than any other form of government', 'In some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be better than a democratic one', 'It doesn't matter whether the regime is democratic or not'". Responses are coded "1" (democracy is preferable to any other kind of government), otherwise "0." "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**CORR**: From 1995 to 2003, the question used was: "Which of the following problems is the most important according to you?" Responses are coded "1" (corruption) or "0" (any other problem). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

From 2004 to 2009, the question was: "Did you or one of your relatives hear about a corruption act in the last twelve months?" Responses are coded "1" (yes) or "0" (no). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

**WASTA**: "During the past five years, have you ever used wasta to achieve something personal, family related, or a neighborhood problem?" Responses are coded "1" (yes) or "0" (no). "Don't know" and "No response" recoded as missing.

#### - APPENDIX 3 -

### Significance of the ECONOMY variable by model type and region

Our analysis generated 244 different sets of outputs for the VOTE/full model and 201 sets of outputs for the APPROV/full model. The VOTE model produced 159 outputs (76%) with economic assessments reaching the conventional levels of statistical significance. The APPROV model produced 192 outputs (96%) with economic assessments being statistically significant. In the vast majority of cases, it appears that economic assessments are directly linked to incumbent support. Individuals with negative assessments are more likely to disapprove of the incumbent president/government, while those with positive assessments are more likely to support the incumbent. The fact that economic assessments are more often statistically significant in the APPROV model is not surprising given that the surveys used for the analysis are not formal election studies and are most often administered well outside of the electoral calendar.

Table 1 Statistical significance of the ECONOMY variable by model type and region

	VOTE/full model		APPROV/full model	
	Sig. (n)	Not sig. (n)	Sig. (n)	Not sig. (n)
Africa	27	7	58	7
Arab World			7	
Asia			6	
Latin America	159	51	121	2
Total	186	58	192	9

Of the 58 cases in which no significant effect is found for the VOTE model, 51 are Latin American countries (Argentina 1997; Bolivia 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2005; Brazil 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2001; Chile 1995, 1996, 1997, 2008, and 2009; Colombia 1997, 2001, and 2003; Costa Rica 2005 and 2008; Ecuador 1996, 1997, 2000, and 2003; El Salvador 1997, 2003, 2007, and

2008; Guatemala 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 Mexico 1998 and 2000; Nicaragua 1996, 2004, 2005, and 2006; Panama 2008; Paraguay 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2008; Peru 2004; Venezuela 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2009) and the others are Sub-Saharan Africa countries (Benin 2005; Kenya 2008; Madagascar 2008; Namibia 2005, and 2008; Nigeria 2005; and Tanzania 2005). Cases in which we do not find evidence of an economic effect on incumbent support represent 32 percent of the Latin American surveys and 26 percent of the African surveys. These results are quite similar to those obtained by Duch and Stevenson (2006) in industrial democracies.

Our analyses further indicate that economic assessments have a significant effect in the vast majority of cases in the APPROV models. While it is statistically significant in every Asian and Arab surveys, we only fail to detect an effect in 7 African (Botswana 2003; Burkina Faso 2008; Cape Verde 2008; Lesotho 2003; Mali 2002, 2008; Zimbabwe 20050 and 2 Latin American (Guatemala 2003, 2007) surveys. We thus fail to find evidence of an economic effect in 12 percent of the African cases and slightly less than 2 percent of the Latin American cases.

#### - APPENDIX 4 -

### Explanatory power of the models

Despite this generalized pattern, both the full and reduced forms of the model offer limited explanatory power. On average, our analyses produce McFadden's pseudo R-squared values of 0.09 and 0.12 for the VOTE and APPROV models, respectively. Our models are therefore slightly better at explaining variation in incumbent approval (APPROV) than they are at explaining vote intentions (VOTE). Further analyses indicate that the exclusion of the IDEOLOGY and CONTROLS variables substantially reduces the model fit, to a pseudo R-squared of 0.04 and 0.07 for the VOTE and APPROV models respectively.

Table 2 Pseudo R-Squared mean value by region and model type

	VOTE/full model		APPROV/full model	
	Full Model	Reduced Model	Full Model	Reduced Model
Africa	0.08	0.03	0.11	0.04
Arab World			0.11	0.08
Asia			0.12	0.06
Latin America	0.10	0.05	0.13	0.08
Mean	0.09	0.04	0.12	0.07

- **APPENDIX 5** - Mean economic effect by model type and region

_	VOTE		APPROV	
	Full Model	Reduced Model	Full Model	Reduced Model
Africa	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06
Arab World			-0.06	-0.06
Asia			-0.07	-0.08
Latin America	-0.05	-0.05	-0.10	-0.11
Mean	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	-0.09

## - APPENDIX 6 -

# Mean economic effect by country and year

# VOTE



## **APPROV**



# **Supplementary Materials Reference List**

**Duch, R.M., Stevenson, R.T., 2006a.** Assessing the magnitude of the economic vote over time and across nations. Electoral Studies 25 (3), 528-547.