and in this way the decent person comes to have better images <in dreams> than just any random person has. §14 Enough about this, however, and let us leave aside the nutritive part, since by nature it has no share in human virtue.

§15 Another nature in the soul would also seem to be non-rational, though in a way it shares in reason. For in the / continent and the incontinent person we praise their reason and the <part> of the soul that has reason, because they act correctly and towards whatever is best; but they evidently also have in them some other <part> that is by nature something apart from reason, clashing and struggling with reason. For just as uncontrolled¹³ parts of a body, when we decide to / move them to the right, do the contrary and move off to the left, the same is true of the soul; for incontinent people have impulses in contrary directions. §16 In bodies, admittedly, we see the part go astray, whereas we do not see it in the soul; nonetheless, presumably, we should suppose that the soul also has something apart from reason, countering and opposing / reason. The <precise> way it is different does not matter. §17 However, this <part> as well <as the rational part> appears, as we said, to share in reason. At any rate, in the continent person it obeys reason; and in the temperate and the brave person it presumably listens still better to reason, since there it agrees with reason in everything.¹²

§18 The non-rational <part>, then, as well <as the whole soul> apparently has two parts. For while the plantlike <part> shares / in reason not at all, the <part> that has appetites and in general desires¹³ shares in reason in a way, insofar as it both listens to reason and obeys it. This is the way in which we are said to 'listen to reason' from father or friends, as opposed to the way in which <we 'give the reason'> in mathematics.¹⁴ The non-rational part also <obeys and> is persuaded in some way by reason, as is shown by correction, and by every sort / of reproof and exhortation.

§19 If, then, we ought to say that this <part> also has reason, then the <part> that has reason, as well <as the non-rational part>, will have two parts. One will have reason fully, by having it within itself; the other will have reason by listening to reason as to a father.¹⁵

The division between virtues accords with this difference. / For some virtues are called virtues of thought, others virtues of character. Wisdom, comprehension, and prudence are called virtues of thought, generosity and temperance virtues of character.¹⁶ For when we speak

of someone's character we do not say that he is wise or has good comprehension, but that he is gentle or temperate. And yet, we also praise the wise person for his state, / and those states that are praiseworthy we call virtues.

Book II

[Book II]

[Virtue of character]

1

[How a virtue of character is acquired]

Virtue, then, is of two sorts, virtue of thought and virtue / of character.¹ Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching; that is why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character <i.e., of éthos> results from habit <ethos>; hence its name 'ethical', slightly varied from 'ethos'.²

§2 Hence it is also clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us naturally. / For if something is by nature in one condition, habituation cannot bring it into another condition. A stone, for instance, by nature moves downwards, and habituation could not make it move upwards, not even if you threw it up ten thousand times to habituate it; nor could habituation make fire move downwards, or bring anything that is by nature in one condition into another condition. §3 And so the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against / nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit.³

§4 Further, if something arises in us by nature, we first have the capacity for it, and later perform the activity. This is clear in the case of the senses; for we did not acquire them by / frequent seeing or hearing, but we already had them when we exercised them, and did not get them by exercising them. Virtues, by contrast, we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having first performed the actions. For we learn a craft by producing the same product that we must produce when we have learned it; we become builders, for instance, by building, and we become harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, then, we become just / by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions.⁴

§5 What goes on in cities is also evidence for this. For the legislator makes the citizens good by habituating them, and / this is the wish
of every legislator; if he fails to do it well he misses his goal.\(^5\) Correct habituation distinguishes a good political system from a bad one.

§6 Further, the sources and means that develop each virtue also ruin it, just as they do in a craft. For playing the harp makes both good and bad harpists, and it is analogous in the / case of builders and all the rest; for building well makes good builders, and building badly makes bad ones. \(^7\) Otherwise no teacher would be needed, but everyone would be born a good or a bad craftsman.

It is the same, then, with the virtues. For what we do in our dealings / with other people makes some of us just, some unjust, and what we do in terrifying situations, and the habits of fear or confidence that we acquire, make some of us brave and others cowardly. The same is true of situations involving appetites and anger; for one or another sort of conduct in these situations / makes some people temperate and calm, but other people intemperate and irascible. To sum it up in a single account: a state <of character> results from <the repetition of> similar actions.\(^6\)

§7 That is why we must perform the right actions, since differences in these imply corresponding differences in the states.\(^7\) It is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right from our youth. On the contrary, it is / very important, indeed all-important.

2

[Habituation]

[c2] Our present discussion does not aim, as our others do, at study; for the purpose of our examination is not to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry / would be of no benefit to us.\(^1\) And so we must examine the right ways of acting; for, as we have said, the actions also control the sorts of states we acquire.

§2 First, then, actions should accord with the correct reason.\(^2\) That is a common <belief>,\(^3\) and let us assume it. We shall discuss it later, and say what the correct reason is and how it is related to the other virtues.

§3 But let us take it as agreed in advance that every account of the actions we should do\(^4\) has to be stated in outline, not exactly. As we also said at the beginning, the type of accounts we demand should accord with the subject matter; and questions about actions and expediency, like questions about health, have no fixed answers.\(^5\)

§4 While this is the character of our general account, the account of particular cases is still more inexact. For these fall under no craft or profession; the agents themselves must consider in each case what the opportune action is, as doctors and navigators do.\(^6\) The account we offer, then, in our present inquiry is of this inexact sort; still, we must try to offer help.\(^7\)

§6 First, then, we should observe that these sorts of states naturally tend to be ruined by excess and deficiency. We see this happen with strength and health (for we must use evident cases as witnesses to things that are / not evident).\(^8\) For both excess and deficient exercise ruin bodily strength, and, similarly, too much or too little eating or drinking ruins health, whereas the proportionate amount produces, increases and preserves it.

§7 The same is true, then, of temperance, bravery, and the / other virtues. For if, for instance, someone avoids and is afraid of everything, standing firm against nothing, he becomes cowardly; if he is afraid of nothing at all and goes to face everything, he becomes rash. Similarly, if he gratifies himself with every pleasure and abstains from none, he becomes intemperate; if he avoids them all, as boors do, he becomes / some sort of insensible person. Temperance and bravery, then, are ruined by excess and deficiency, but preserved by the mean.\(^9\)

§8 But these actions are not only the sources and causes both of the emergence and growth of virtues and of their ruin; the activities of the virtues also consist in these / same actions.\(^10\) For this is also true of more evident cases; strength, for instance, arises from eating a lot and from withstanding much hard labour, and it is the strong person who is most capable of these very actions. \(^9\) It is the same with the virtues. For abstaining from pleasures makes us become temperate, / and once we have become temperate we are most capable / of abstaining from pleasures. It is similar with bravery; habituation in disdain for frightening situations and in standing firm against them makes us become brave, and once we have become brave we shall be most capable of standing firm.

3

[The importance of pleasure and pain]

But we must take the pleasure or pain that supervenes on his / actions to be a sign of the state <of character>.\(^1\) For if someone who abstains
from bodily pleasures enjoys this <abstinence> itself, he is temperate; but if he is grieved by it, he is intemperate.² Again, if he stands firm against terrifying situations and enjoys it, or at least does not find it painful, he is brave; but if he finds it painful, he is cowardly. For virtue of character is about pleasures and pains.³

/ For pleasure causes us to do base actions, and pain causes us to abstain from fine ones. §2 That is why we need to have had the appropriate upbringing—right from early youth, as Plato says⁴—to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things; for this is the correct education.

§3 Further, virtues are about actions and feelings; but every feeling and every action implies pleasure or / pain;⁵ hence, for this reason too, virtue is about pleasures and pains. §4 Corrective treatments also indicate this, since they use pleasures and pains; for correction is a form of medical treatment, and medical treatment naturally operates through contraries.

§5 Further, as we said earlier, every state of soul is naturally related to and about whatever naturally makes / it better or worse; and pleasures and pains make people base, from pursuing and avoiding the wrong ones, at the wrong time, in the wrong ways, or whatever other distinctions of that sort are needed in an account. These <bad effects of pleasure and pain> are the reason why people actually define the virtues as ways of being unaffected / and undisturbed <by pleasures and pains>.⁶ They are wrong, however, because they speak of being unaffected without qualification, not of being unaffected in the right or wrong way, at the right or wrong time, and the added qualifications.

§6 We assume, then, that virtue is the sort of state that does the best actions concerning pleasures and pains, and that vice is the contrary state.

§7 The following will also make it evident that virtue / and vice are about the same things. For there are three objects of choice—fine, expedient, and pleasant—and three objects of avoidance—their contraries, shameful, harmful, and painful.⁷ About all these, then, the good person is correct and the bad person is in error, and especially / about pleasure. For pleasure is shared with animals, and implied / by every object of choice, since what is fine and what is expedient appear pleasant as well.

§8 Further, pleasure grows up with all of us from infancy on. That is why it is hard to rub out this feeling that is dyed into our lives. We also estimate actions <as well as feelings>, some / of us more, some less, by pleasure and pain. §9 For this reason, our whole discussion must be about these; for good or bad enjoyment or pain is very important for our actions.

§10 Further, it is more difficult to fight pleasure than to fight spirit—and Heracleitus tells us <how difficult it is to fight spirit>.⁸ Now both craft and virtue in every case are about / what is more difficult, since a good result is even better when it is more difficult. Hence, for this reason also, the whole discussion, for virtue and political science alike, must consider pleasures and pains; for if we use these well, we shall be good, and if badly, bad.

§11 To sum up: virtue is about pleasures and pains; the / actions that are its sources also increase it or, if they are done badly, ruin it; and its activity is about the same actions as those that are its sources.

4

[Virtuous actions contrasted with virtuous character]

[c3] Someone might be puzzled, however, about what we mean by saying that we become just by doing just actions and become temperate by doing temperate actions.¹ For <one might suppose that> if we do grammatical or musical actions, we / are grammarians or musicians, and, similarly, if we do just or temperate actions, we are thereby just or temperate.

§2 Or are actions insufficient in the case of crafts as well?² For it is possible to produce a grammatical result by chance, or by following someone else’s instructions. To be grammarians, then, we must both produce a grammatical result and produce / it grammatically—that is to say, produce it in accord with the grammatical knowledge in us.

§3 Moreover, in any case, what is true of crafts is not true of virtues.³ For the products of a craft determine by their own qualities whether they have been produced well; and so it suffices that they have the right qualities when they have been produced.⁴ But for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does not suffice that / they themselves have the right qualities.⁵ Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know <that he is doing them>⁶; secondly, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, thirdly, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.