understanding. And thus we are brought to the nub of the matter. To conduct a progressive school is much more difficult than to conduct a formal one. Standards, materials, methods are already at hand for the latter; the teacher needs only to follow and conform. Upon the whole, it is not surprising that, in history, science, the arts and other school "studies," there is still a lack of subject matter which has been organized upon the basis of connection with the pupils' own growth in insight and power. The time-span of progressive schools has been too short to permit very much to be accomplished. What may rightfully be demanded, however, is that the progressive schools recognize their responsibility for accomplishing this task, so as not to be content with casual improvisation and living intellectually from hand to mouth.

Again one needs to guard against misunderstanding. There is no single body of subject matter which can be worked out, even in the course of years, which will be applicable all over the country. I am not arguing for any such outcome; I know of nothing that would so completely kill progressive schools and turn them into another kind of formal schools, differentiated only by having another set of conventions. Even in the same school, what will work with one group of children will not "take" with another group of the same age. Full recognition of the fact that subject matter must be always changing with locality, with the situation and with the particular type of children is, however, quite consistent with equal recognition of the fact that it is possible to work out varied bodies of consecutive subject matter upon which teachers may draw, each in his own way, in conducting his own work. The older type of education could draw upon a body of information, of subject matter and skills which was arranged from the adult standpoint. Progressive education must have a much larger, more expansive and adaptable body of materials and activities, developed through constant study of the conditions and methods favorable to the consecutive development of power and understanding. The weakness of existing progressive education is due to the meagre knowledge which anyone has regarding the conditions and laws of continuity which govern the development of mental power. To this extent its defects are inevitable and are not to be complained of. But if progressive schools become complacent with existing accomplishments, unaware of the slight foundation of knowledge upon which they rest, and careless regarding the amount of study of the laws of growth that remains to be done, a reaction against them is sure to take place. . . .

PRAGMATISM
AND THE
NEW DEAL

There is an intrinsic connection between choice as freedom and power of action as freedom. A choice which intelligently manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and this enlargement in turn confers upon our desires greater insight and foresight, and makes choice more intelligent. There is a circle, but an enlarging circle, or, if you please, a widening spiral. This statement is of course only a formula. We may perhaps supply it with meaning by first considering the matter negatively. Take for example an act following from a blind preference, from an impulse not reflected upon. It will be a matter of luck if the resulting action does not get the one who acts into conflict with surrounding conditions. Conditions go against the realization of his preference; they cut across it, obstruct it, deflect its course, get him into new and perhaps more serious entanglements. Luck may be on his side. Circumstances may happen to be propitious or he may be endowed with native force that enables him to brush aside obstructions and sweep away resistances. He thus gets a certain freedom, judged from the side of power-to-do. But this result is a matter of favor, of grace, of luck; it is not due to anything in himself. Sooner or later he is likely to find his deeds at odds with conditions; an accidental success may only reinforce a foolhardy impulsiveness that renders a man's future subject to the more probable. Endurlyngly lucky persons are exceptions.

Suppose, on the other hand, our hero's act exhibits a choice expressing a preference formed after consideration of consequences, an intelligent preference. Consequences depend upon an interaction of what he starts to perform with his environment, so he must take the latter into account. No one can foresee all consequences because no one can be aware of all the conditions that enter into their production. Every person builds better or worse than he knows. Good fortune or the favorable cooperation of environment is still necessary. Even with his best thought, a man's proposed course of action may be defeated. But in as far as his act is truly a manifestation of intelligent choice, he learns something—as in a scien-

tific experiment an inquirer may learn through his experimentation, his intelligently directed action, quite as much or even more from a failure than from a success. He finds out at least a little as to what was the matter with his prior choice. He can choose better and do better next time; “better choice” meaning a more reflective one, and “better doing” meaning one better coordinated with the conditions that are involved in realizing his purpose. Such control or power is never complete; luck or fortune, the propitious support of circumstances not foreseeable is always involved. But at least such a person forms the habit of choosing and acting with conscious regard to the grain of circumstance, the run of affairs. And what is more to the point, such a man becomes able to turn frustration and failure to account in his further choices and purposes. Everything insofar serves his purpose—to be an intelligent human being. This gain in power or freedom can be nullified by no amount of external defeats.

In a phrase just used, it was implied that intelligent choice may operate on different levels or in different areas. A man may, so to speak, specialize in intelligent choices in the region of economic or political affairs; he may be shrewd, politic, within the limit of these conditions, and insofar attain power in action or be free. Moralists have always held that such success is not success, such power not power, such freedom not freedom, in the ultimate sense.

One does not need to enter upon hortatory moralization in order to employ this contention of the great moral teachers for the sake of elicting two points. The first is that there are various areas of freedom, because there is a plural diversity of conditions in our environment, and choice, intelligent choice, may select the special area formed by one special set of conditions—familial and domestic, industrial, pecuniary, political, charitable, scientific, ecclesiastic, artistic, etc. I do not mean of course that these areas are sharply delimited or that there is not something artificial in their segregation. But within limits, conditions are such that specialized types of choice and kinds of power or freedom develop. The second (and this is the one emphasized by moral teachers in drawing a line between true and false power and freedom), is that there may be—these moral idealists insist there is—one area in which freedom and power are always attainable by any one, no matter how much he may be blocked in other fields. This of course is the area they call moral in a distinctive sense. To put it roughly but more concretely: Any one can be kind, helpful to others, just and temperate in his choices, and insofar be sure of achievement and power in action. It would take more rashness than I possess to assert that there is not an observation of reality in this insight of the great teachers of the race. But without taking up that point,

one may venture with confidence upon a hypothetical statement. If and insofar as this idea is correct, there is one way in which the force of fortunate circumstance and lucky original endowment is reduced in comparison with the force of the factor supplied by personal individuality itself. Success, power, freedom in special fields is in a maximum degree relatively at the mercy of external conditions. But against kindness and justice there is no law: that is, no counteracting grain of things nor run of affairs. With respect to such choices, there may be freedom and power, no matter what the frustrations and failures in other modes of action. Such is the virtual claim of moral prophets.

An illustration drawn from the denial of the idea that there is an intimate connection of the two modes of freedom, namely, intelligent choice and power in action, may aid in clearing up the idea. The attitude and acts of other persons is of course one of the most important parts of the conditions involved in bringing the manifestation of preference to impotency or to power in action. Take the case of a child in a family where the environment formed by others is such as to humor all his choices. It is made easy for him to do what he pleases. He meets a minimum of resistance; upon the whole others cooperate with him in bringing his preferences to fulfillment. Within this region he seems to have free power of action. By description he is unimpeded, even aided. But it is obvious that as far as he is concerned, this is a matter of luck. He is “free” merely because his surrounding conditions happen to be of the kind they are, a mere happening or accident as far as his make-up and his preferences are concerned. It is evident in such a case that there is no growth in the intelligent exercise of preferences. There is rather a conversion of blind impulse into regular habits. Hence his attained freedom is such only in appearance: it disappears as he moves into other social conditions.

Now consider the opposite case. A child is balked, inhibited, interfered with and nagged pretty continuously in the manifestation of his spontaneous preferences. He is constantly “disciplined” by circumstances adverse to his preferences—as discipline is not infrequently conceived. Does it follow then that he develops in “inner” freedom, in thoughtful preference and purpose? The question answers itself. Rather is some pathological condition the outcome. “Discipline” is indeed necessary as a preliminary to any freedom that is more than unrestrained outward power. But our dominant conception of discipline is a travesty; there is only one genuine discipline, namely, that which takes effect in producing habits of observation and judgment that ensure intelligent desires. In short, while men do not think about and gain freedom in conduct unless they run during action against conditions that resist their original impulses, the
secret of education consists in having that blend of check and favor which influences thought and foresight, and that takes effect in outward action through this modification of disposition and outlook.

I have borrowed the illustration from the life of a child at home or in school, because the problem is familiar and easily recognizable in those settings. But there is no difference when we consider the adult in industrial, political and ecclesiastic life. When social conditions are such as to prepare a prosperous career for a man's spontaneous preferences in advance, when things are made easy by institutions and by habits of admiration and approval, there is precisely the same kind of outward freedom, of relatively unimpeded action, as in the case of the spoiled child. But there is hardly more of freedom on the side of varied and flexible capacity of choice; preferences are restricted to the one line laid down, and in the end the individual becomes the slave of his successes. Others, vastly more in number, are in the state of the "disciplined" child. There is hard sledding for their spontaneous preferences; the grain of the environment, especially of existing economic arrangements, runs against them. But the check, the inhibition to the immediate operation of their native preferences no more confers on them the quality of intelligent choice than it does with the child who never gets a fair chance to try himself out. There is only a crushing that results in apathy and indifference; a deflection into evasion and deceit; a compensatory over-responsiveness to such occasions as permit untrained preferences to run riot—and all the other consequences which the literature of mental and moral pathology has made familiar.

I hope these illustrations may at least have rendered reasonably clear what is intended by our formula; by the idea that freedom consists in a trend of conduct that causes choices to be more diversified and flexible, more plastic and more cognizant of their own meaning, while it enlarges their range of unimpeded operation. There is an important implication in this idea of freedom. The orthodox theory of freedom of the will and the classic theory of Liberalism both define freedom on the basis of something antecedently given, something already possessed. Unlike in contents as are the imputation of unmotivated liberty of choice and of natural rights and native wants, the two ideas have an important element in common. They both seek for freedom in something already there, given in advance. Our idea compels us on the other hand to seek for freedom in something which comes to be, in a certain kind of growth; in consequences, rather than in antecedents. We are free not because of what we statically are, but insofar as we are becoming different from what we have been. Reference to another philosophy of freedom, that of Immanuel Kant, who is placed chronologically in the generation pre-ceeding that of Hegel and institutional idealism, may aid in developing this idea. If we ignore the cumbersome technicalities of Kant, we may take him as one who was impressed by the rise of natural science and the role played in science by the idea of causation, this being defined as a necessary, universal or invariant connection of phenomena. Kant saw that in all consistency this principle applies to human phenomena as well as to physical; it is a law of all phenomena. Such a chain of linked phenomena left no room for freedom. But Kant believed in duty and duty postulates freedom. Hence in his moral being, man is not a phenomenon but a member of a realm of noumena to which as things-in-themselves free causality may be ascribed. It is with the problem rather than the solution we are concerned. How one and the same act can be, naturalistically speaking, causally determined while transcendentally speaking it is free from any such determination is so high a mystery that I shall pass it by.

But the problem as Kant stated it has the form in which it weighs most heavily on contemporary consciousness. The idea of a reign of law, of the inclusion of all events under law, has become almost omnipresent. No freedom seems to be left save by alleging that man is somehow supernatural in his make-up—an idea of which Kant's noumenal and transcendent man is hardly more than a translation into a more impressive phraseology.

This way of stating the problem of freedom makes overt, explicit, the assumption that either freedom is something antecedently possessed or else it is nothing at all. The idea is so current that it seems hopeless to question its value. But suppose that the origin of every thought I have had and every word I have uttered is in some sense causally determined, so that if anybody knew enough he could explain the origin of each thought and each word just as the scientific inquirer ideally hopes to explain what happens physically. Suppose also—the argument is hypothetical and so imagination may be permitted to run riot—that my words had the effect of rendering the future choices of some one of my hearers more thoughtful; more cognizant of possible alternatives, and thereby rendering his future choices more varied, flexible and apt. Would the fact of antecedent causality deprive those future preferences of their actual quality? Would it take away their reality and that of their operation in producing their distinctive effects? There is no superstition more bemuming, I think, than the current notion that things are not what they are, and do not do what they are seen to do, because these things have themselves come into being in a causal way. Water is what it does rather than what it is caused by. The same is true of the fact of intelligent choice. A philosophy which looks for freedom in antecedents and one which looks for it in consequences, in a developing course of action, in
becoming rather than in static being, will have very different notions about it.

Yet we cannot separate power to become from consideration of what already and antecedently is. Capacity to become different, even though we define freedom by it, must be a present capacity, something in some sense present. At this point of the inquiry, the fact that all existences whatever possess selectivity in action recurs with new import. It may sound absurd to speak of electrons and atoms exhibiting preference, still more perhaps to attribute bias to them. But the absurdity is wholly a matter of the words used. The essential point is that they have a certain opaque and irreducible individuality which shows itself in what they do; in the fact that they behave in certain ways and not in others. In the description of causal sequences, we still have to start with and from existences, things that are individually and uniquely just what they are. The fact that we can state changes which occur by certain uniformities and regularities does not eliminate this original element of individuality, of preference and bias. On the contrary, the statement of laws presupposes just this capacity. We cannot escape this fact by an attempt to treat each thing as an effect of other things. That merely pushes individuality back into those other things. Since we have to admit individuality no matter how far we carry the chase, we might as well forego the labor and start with the unescapable fact.

In short, anything that is has something unique in itself, and this unique something enters into what it does. Science does not concern itself with the individualities of things. It is concerned with their relations. A law or statement of uniformity like that of the so-called causal sequence tells us nothing about a thing inherently; it tells us only about an invariant relation sustained in behavior of that thing with that of other things. That this fact implies contingency as an ultimate and irreducible trait of existence is something too complicated to go into here. But evidence could be stated from many contemporary philosophers of science, not writing with any thought of freedom in mind, but simply as interpreters of the methods and conclusions of science, to the effect that the laws leave out of account the inner being of things, and deal only with their relations with other things. Indeed, if this were the place and if I only knew enough, it could be shown, I think, that the great change now going on in the physical sciences, is connected with this idea. Older formulas were in effect guilty of confusion. They took knowledge of the relations that things bear to one another as if it were knowledge of the things themselves. Many of the corrections that are now being introduced into physical theories are due to recognition of this confusion.

The point needs an elaboration that cannot here be given if its full import for the idea and fact of freedom is to be clearly perceived. But the connection is there and its general nature may be seen. The fact that all things show bias, preference or selectivity of reaction, while not itself freedom, is an indispensable condition of any human freedom. The present tendency among scientific men is to think of laws as statistical in nature—that is, as statements of an “average” found in the behavior of an enormous number of things, no two of which are exactly alike. If this line of thought be followed out, it implies that the existence of laws or uniformities and regularities among natural phenomena, human acts included, does not in the least exclude the item of choice as a distinctive fact having its own distinctive consequences. No law does away with individuality of existence, having its own particular way of operating; for a law is concerned with relations and hence presupposes the being and operation of individuals. If choice is found to be a distinctive act, having distinctive consequences, then no appeal to the authority of scientific law can militate in any way against its reality. The problem reduces to one of fact. Just what is intelligent choice and just what does it effect in human life? I cannot ask you to retraverse the ground already gone over. But I do claim that the considerations already adduced reveal that what men actually cherish under the name of freedom is that power of varied and flexible growth, of change of disposition and character, that springs from intelligent choice, so there is a sound basis for the common-sense practical belief in freedom, although theories in justification of this belief have often taken an erroneous and even absurd form.

We may indeed go further than we have gone. Not only is the presence of uniform relations of change no bar to the reality of freedom, but these are, when known, aids to the development of that freedom. Take the suppositional case already mentioned. That my ideas have causes signifies that their rise, their origin (not their nature), is a change connected with other changes. If I only knew the connection, my power over obtaining the ideas I want would be that much increased. The same thing holds good of any effect my idea may have upon the ideas and choices of some one else. Knowledge of the conditions under which a choice arises is the same as potential ability to guide the formation of choices intelligently. This does not eliminate the distinctive quality of choice; choice is still choice. But it is now an intelligent choice instead of a dumb and stupid one, and thereby the probability of its leading to freedom in unimpeded action is increased.

This fact explains the strategic position occupied in our social and political life by the issue of freedom of thought and freedom of speech. It is unnecessary to dwell by way of either laudation or exhortation upon the importance of this freedom. If the position already taken—namely,
that freedom resides in the development of preferences into intelligent choices. It is an expansion of the central character of this particular sort of freedom. It has been assumed in accord with the whole theory of Liberalism, that all that is necessary to secure freedom of thought and expression is to remove the obstacles to speech, and to open up a forum for discussion without impediment. No matter how we define a limit of expression, or whether it is a question of the numbers of words, the distance between any two points, or the number of persons who may or may not express an opinion, the power and liberty of expression is the same. The only difference is this: when a person expresses an opinion, he is more free because his own ideas are then digested and made to work for him. The open door of public discussion and political activity gives way to a wrung up and moralized condition of the birth of ideas and knowledge of other growth into health and vigor.

I sum up by saying it is one with our individuality, but not with others. Like all other possibilities, this possibility is too great a subject to be actualized, and like all other possibilities, this possibility is too great a subject to be actualized. The conditions that led to the potentiality of freedom each of us carries with him in his very structure, constant and uniform relations to freedom, and knowledge of others. Some are favorable to the overbearing and restrictive, others to the freedom of thought, but the conditions that led to the potentiality of freedom are not different from the conditions of freedom, but rather from the conditions of freedom. Freedom is too long been thought of as an indeterminate power operating in a world and in some respects indifferent, because open and moving toward a new future.
established rule; to abandon it would be to revert to savagery. The task is to go on, and not backward, until the method of intelligence and experimental control is the rule in social relations and social direction. Either we take this road or we admit that the problem of social organization in behalf of human liberty and the flowering of human capacities is insoluble.

It would be fantastic folly to ignore or to belittle the obstacles that stand in the way. But what has taken place, also against great odds, in the scientific and industrial revolutions, is an accomplished fact; the way is marked out. It may be that the way will remain untrodden. If so, the future holds the menace of confusion moving into chaos, a chaos that will be externally masked for a time by an organization of force, coercive and violent, in which the liberties of men will all but disappear. Even so, the cause of the liberty of the human spirit, the cause of opportunity of human beings for full development of their powers, the cause for which liberalism endures, stands, is too precious and too ingrained in the human constitution to be forever obscured. Intelligence after millions of years of errancy has found itself as a method, and it will not be lost forever in the blackness of night. The business of liberalism is to bend every energy and exhibit every courage so that these precious goods may not even be temporarily lost but be intensified and expanded here and now.

The Pathos of Liberalism

Reinhold Niebuhr

No one in America has a more generally conceded right to speak in the name of liberalism than John Dewey. He has been for many years not only the leading philosophical exponent of liberal doctrine but the fountain and source of liberal pedagogical theory and method. He has furthermore been active in a score of political and social movements in which he has proved not only his interest in the practical application of his theories but also a courageous willingness to extend both his theory and his practice beyond the limits set by traditional liberalism.

A new book by Professor Dewey therefore offers excellent opportunity to assess the resources of liberalism in the present social scene, particularly since the book is a theoretic elaboration of his advanced position. The great contribution of historic liberalism, declares Professor Dewey, was its emphasis upon liberty and intelligence. Its great need today is to serve the cause of liberty by helping to create a social structure in which the ideal will become a reality for the many and not the few; and to make "freed intelligence" socially effective. All that is good in a modern advanced liberalism is revealed in the development of the first point and all that is dubious betrays itself in the second.

"Liberalism," declares Professor Dewey, "must now become radical, meaning by 'radical' perception of thoroughgoing changes in the set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring the changes to pass. This social radicalism is gradualistic in method but not reformist. 'The process of producing changes will in any case be a gradual one. But reforms,' which deal now with this abuse and now with that without having a social goal based upon an inclusive plan, differ entirely from effort at reforming, in its literal sense, the institutional scheme of things.' The motive of advanced or radical liberalism in seeking this thoroughgoing reorganization of the social order is to secure the value of liberty, to which liberalism is committed, in economic and not merely in legal terms: "The majority who call themselves liberals today are committed to the principle that organized society must use its powers to establish conditions under which the mass of individuals can possess actual as

distinct from merely legal liberty. . . They believe that the conception of the state which limits the activities of the latter to keeping order between individuals and to securing redress for one person when another infringes the liberty existing law has given him is in effect simply a justification of the brutalities and inequities of the existing system."

The ultimate end toward which Professor Dewey's liberalism strives is socialistic: "The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible is one in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively controlled and used in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the individuals that constitute society." This end "can now be achieved only by a reversal of the means to which early liberalism was committed." Professor Dewey's devotion to liberty has, in short, nothing in common with that of Herbert Hoover, who has given such a perfect statement of the plutocratic corruption of the creed of liberalism. Nor has it much in common with the piecemeal reformism of the more timid liberals. His statement of faith is typical of a large body of intellectual liberalism, which resists the dishonest appropriation and corruption of the liberal creed by the plutocratic oligarchs of our society and which sees the problem of social change in larger terms that those of mere reformism.

So far, so good. It is in his discussion of the function of intelligence in the process of social change that the limitations of Professor Dewey's liberalism appear. No one would quarrel with him in his insistence on the necessity of avoiding drift into chaos and the corresponding necessity of an intelligent direction of social change. Nor is he wrong when he protests against the dogmatism of certain types of radicalism. Nevertheless, every argument used in developing his theme of the function of "freed intelligence" in social change betrays a constitutional weakness in the liberal approach to politics. It does not recognize the relation of social and economic interest to the play of intelligence upon social problems. It does not perceive the perennial and inevitable character of the subordination of reason to interest in the social struggle. Its ideal of a "freed intelligence" expects a degree of rational freedom from the particular interests and perspectives of those who think about social problems which is incompatible with the very constitution of human nature.

This weakness reveals itself at every turn. The possibilities of intelligence in social action are supposedly proved by the achievements of science in the development of a technical civilization: "What are the modern forces of production save those of scientific technology? And what is scientific technology save a large-scale demonstration of organized intelligence in action?" This is supposed to refute the Marxian thesis of the revolutionary dynamic created by the incompatibility between new forces of production and the legal property system. Why, then, did not this "organized intelligence" which created a technical civilization create also an economic and political system which would make such a civilization sufferable? The answer is given in the theory of a cultural lag. "The release of productivity is the product of cooperatively organized intelligence," and the "institutional framework is precisely that which is not yet subjected to any considerable degree to the impact of inventive and instructive intelligence." An example of this cultural lag is the notion that social insecurity is an incentive to diligence. "Early liberalism emphasized the importance of insecurity as a fundamentally necessary economic motive." But the "conditions of insecurity now no longer spring from nature," and therefore "insecurity is not now the motive to work and sacrifice but to despair." But the habits of mind and action of the earlier period still persist and operate to retard social change in the interest of greater security. This theory actually assumes that there was a time in which social insecurity was a generator of diligence, and does not recognize that the earlier liberalism, in spite of its greater honesty, was just as much as capitalistic liberalism a tool of class interest. The idea that social insecurity is a necessary incentive to diligence was not true when it was first propounded and is not held now merely because old patterns of thought persist.

The same inability to recognize the perennial enslavement of even "freed intelligence" to partial and particular interests is revealed in Professor Dewey's discussion of violence and social change. With every responsible analyst of the modern social crisis, Professor Dewey would like to resolve our social difficulties without violence. There can be no quarrel with him over his thesis of the perils of violence not only to the proletarian proponents of a new social order but to civilization itself. But the discussion of the possibility of avoiding violence lacks realism because Professor Dewey again sees violence only as a consequence of a social ignorance which a more perfect intelligence will be able to eliminate. Unlike many liberals he sees the coercive and even violent character of present society: "It is not pleasant to face the extent to which, as a matter of fact, coercive and violent force are relied upon in the present social system as a means of social control." The assumption "that the method of intelligence already rules and that those who urge the use of violence are introducing a new element into the social picture may not be hypocritical but it is unintelligently unaware of what is actually involved in intelligence as an alternative method of social action." In other words, the real question is how the holders of privilege and power are to be
dissuaded from violence as a means of preventing necessary social change. This must be done by destroying the "ingrained habit of regarding intelligence as an individual possession and its exercise as an individual right"—"liberalism must assume the responsibility for making it clear that intelligence is a social asset and is clothed with a function as public as is its origin." A liberalism which defends liberty as a public necessity rather than a private right will supposedly sooth the savage breast of an imperiled and frantic oligarchy, while the older and more individualistic liberalism merely succeeded in maintaining liberty "as long as it did not menace the status quo." One might as well expect to beguile the gentlemen of the Liberty League to modify their touching devotion to the Constitution by proving to them logically, rationally, and intellectually that the flexibility of the Constitution is a necessary prerequisite of orderly social change.

To say all this is not to assume that violence and civil war are absolutely inevitable in basic social change. But their avoidance depends upon quite different considerations from those advanced by Professor Dewey; upon the possibility, for instance, of securing some modicum of political cooperation between the industrial workers, the farmers, and the lower middle classes. If that cannot be achieved, and if the lower middle classes must inevitably become the allies of an imperiled plutocracy, violence will scarcely be avoided, no matter how much intellectuals may bewail the tragic and tortuous character of the processes of history.

It must be said in conclusion that Professor Dewey expressly denies that liberalism ignores the fact that conflicting interests in society prevent the method of experimental intelligence from being as effective in social problems as in the physical sciences. "The method of democracy is to bring these conflicting interests out into the open, where their special claims can be seen and appraised and where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests." Now it is a fact that many conflicts of interest are thus arbitrated, at least when the contrast between them is not too sharp and when the contending parties do not absorb the total community and therefore destroy the last remnant of impartiality and neutrality in the community with reference to a particular dispute. It is when that happens that we have a revolutionary situation.

In envisaging the possibilities of a rational arbitration of conflicting interests Professor Dewey hopes for a day in which party disputes will give way to an impartial and scientific inquiry into the cause and effect of social realities and the means and ends of social policies. "The idea that the conflict of parties will, by means of public discussion, bring out necessary public truths" has nothing "in common with the procedure of organized cooperative inquiry, which has won the triumphs of science in the field of physical nature." We are back, in other words, where we began, on the thesis that nothing but a cultural lag prevents men from viewing the social policies in which they are involved with the same degree of objectivity they use in delving into the mysteries of biochemistry or astronomy. Whatever the possibilities and necessities of social intelligence in social action, that thesis is a hopeless one. In so far as a "renascent liberalism" rests upon it, it will confuse the political problem. Its stubbornness in maintaining the thesis imparts an aspect of pathos to even so courageous and honest a liberalism as that of Professor Dewey.